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Secronyx
AvailableLinuxWindowsmacOS

Alertmanager

See which alerts Alertmanager holds and whether a silence or inhibition suppresses them, which silences exist and what they match, and whether the cluster has formed, through read-only requests to the HTTP API.

What it answers

Questions an on-call engineer asks, which an AI client can answer with this integration.

  • Did Alertmanager receive the alert, and is it silenced or inhibited?
  • Which receiver does an alert route to?
  • Which silences are active, what do they match and when do they end?
  • Who created a silence?
  • Is the Alertmanager cluster ready, and which peers are in it?
  • Which Alertmanager version is running, and since when?

What it returns

Each of the integration's read-only tools, described in words.

  • Alerts Alertmanager holds with their name, severity, job and instance, state (active, suppressed or unprocessed), the silences and alerts that suppress them, receivers, labels and start and end times
  • Alertmanager silences with their ID, state (active, pending or expired), the label matchers they apply to, who created them, and when they start, end and were last updated
  • Alertmanager cluster state in one row - whether gossip is ready, settling or disabled, the cluster peers and their addresses, this node's name, the version and when it started

At a glance

Integration
alertmanager 1.0.0
Publisher
levantar
Platforms
Linux, Windows, macOS

Tested on

  • Alertmanager 0.27.0 and 0.34.2 on Linux (Ubuntu 24.04, Docker), test lab
  • Alertmanager 0.27.0 on macOS (official release), test lab
  • Alertmanager 0.27.0 on Windows Server 2022 (official release), test lab

How it logs in

Without an explicit choice, configure tries the methods that need no secret first, in this order.

  • No login (a local endpoint)
  • A user name and password
  • A bearer token

The least-privilege login

The setup file that comes with it. secronyx integration setup alertmanager prints it; an administrator applies it by hand.

# The least-privilege login for the alertmanager integration. Alertmanager has # no users or roles of its own: every login that reaches its HTTP API can # also create and expire silences and post alerts. So nothing can say how # powerful a login is, and the least privilege is one of: # # 1. On a server that is not protected, use auth none from this host: the # integration calls the API on localhost only. # 2. To protect it natively, add the login to the web config file that # Alertmanager reads with --web.config.file, with a bcrypt hash of its # password (htpasswd -nbBC 10 '' '<password>' | tr -d ':\n'), and # configure with --auth password --allow-unchecked-privilege. That login # can write too, like every other one. basic_auth_users: {{user}}: <bcrypt hash of the password> # 3. For a login that can only read, put a reverse proxy in front of # Alertmanager that gives it GET only, on these paths, and configure with # --auth token (a bearer token) or --auth password and # --allow-unchecked-privilege: # /api/v2/alerts /api/v2/silences /api/v2/status

See it run

Terminal recording from the test lab: alertmanager-linux-install
A real run on the shared test lab. It predates built-in integrations, so the commands on screen use their older names; this step is now secronyx integration configure alertmanager.
Terminal recording from the test lab: alertmanager-linux-setup
A real run on the shared test lab. It predates built-in integrations, so the commands on screen use their older names.
Terminal recording from the test lab: alertmanager-linux-test
A real run on the shared test lab. It predates built-in integrations, so the commands on screen use their older names.
Terminal recording from the test lab: alertmanager-macos-install
A real run on the shared test lab. It predates built-in integrations, so the commands on screen use their older names; this step is now secronyx integration configure alertmanager.

Read-only, in layers

Every request is a GET or HEAD to the endpoint the operator configured, on a path fixed in the signed pack. Redirects are not followed, and requests known to change state are refused.

These controls narrow what the integration can do; none of them is a guarantee on its own. An administrator can still accept a more powerful login on purpose (audited and shown in status), root or Administrator on the host can replace the agent, and the integration can read whatever its login can see.