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Secronyx
In the next releaseLinuxmacOS

ActiveMQ Classic

See how full the broker's memory, store and temp limits are, which queues are deep and whether anything consumes them, and which client connections are slow or blocked, with a web console login that can only read. This plugin is in the next Secronyx release; the current download does not include it yet.

What it answers

Questions an on-call engineer asks, which an AI client can answer with this plugin.

  • Is the broker close to its memory, store or temp limit, so that producers block?
  • Which queues have the most messages waiting, and do they have any consumers?
  • Are messages landing in the dead letter queue?
  • Who is connected to the broker, from where, and is any connection slow or blocked?
  • Can the monitoring login only read, with no way to purge a queue or stop the broker?

What it returns

Each of the plugin's read-only tools, described in words.

  • ActiveMQ Classic broker totals - version, uptime, memory, store and temp usage against their limits, connections, consumers, producers and messages enqueued, dequeued and waiting
  • ActiveMQ Classic queues, one row each - messages waiting, consumers, producers, enqueued, dequeued, in flight and expired counts, memory and store use, and whether it is paused or a dead letter queue
  • Client connections to ActiveMQ Classic, one row each - client ID, user, address, transport connector, whether it is active, slow or blocked, its dispatch backlog and open transactions

At a glance

Plugin
activemq 1.0.0
Publisher
levantar
Platforms
Linux, macOS

Tested on

  • ActiveMQ Classic 6.1.8 on Linux (Ubuntu 24.04, Docker), test lab
  • ActiveMQ Classic 6.1.8 on macOS 15 (Apache tarball, Intel), test lab

How it logs in

Without an explicit choice, install tries the methods that need no secret first, in this order.

  • A user name and password

The least-privilege login

The setup file in the pack. secronyx plugin setup activemq prints it; an administrator applies it by hand.

<!-- The least-privilege login for the activemq plugin: a web console user in a group of its own, secronyx-read, which the console lets do one thing: GET /api/jolokia/read/..., Jolokia's attribute read. It cannot open the console, POST to Jolokia (a POST body can exec or write whatever the path), reach /api/jolokia/exec or /write, or use the REST message API. The privilege check refuses a login that can. ActiveMQ's own groups cannot do this: "users" and "admins" may both POST to Jolokia, and conf/jolokia-access.xml is the same for every login. 1. Add the three beans below inside <beans> in conf/jetty.xml. 2. In the same file, add these two lines to the constraintMappings list of the securityHandler bean: <ref bean="secronyxReadMapping" /> <ref bean="secronyxReadOtherMethodsMapping" /> 3. conf/users.properties, with a long random password: {{user}}=CHANGE-ME conf/groups.properties: secronyx-read={{user}} Give the user no other group. If the broker itself authenticates clients against these files (jaasAuthenticationPlugin), the user can also log in as a client: give group secronyx-read no rights in the broker's authorizationPlugin. 4. Restart ActiveMQ. The login can read any MBean attribute that conf/jolokia-access.xml allows, JVM system properties and arguments included; the plugin itself reads only its three fixed broker, queue and connection paths. --> <bean id="secronyxReadConstraint" class="org.eclipse.jetty.util.security.Constraint"> <property name="name" value="BASIC" /> <property name="roles" value="secronyx-read,users,admins" /> <property name="authenticate" value="true" /> </bean> <bean id="secronyxReadMapping" class="org.eclipse.jetty.security.ConstraintMapping"> <property name="constraint" ref="secronyxReadConstraint" /> <property name="pathSpec" value="/api/jolokia/read/*" /> <property name="method" value="GET" /> </bean> <!-- Every other method on that path stays with users and admins. --> <bean id="secronyxReadOtherMethodsMapping" class="org.eclipse.jetty.security.ConstraintMapping"> <property name="constraint" ref="securityConstraint" /> <property name="pathSpec" value="/api/jolokia/read/*" /> </bean>

See it run

Terminal recording from the test lab: activemq-linux-harness
A real run on the shared test lab.

Read-only, in layers

Every request is a GET or HEAD to the endpoint the operator configured, on a path fixed in the signed pack. Redirects are not followed, and requests known to change state are refused.

These controls narrow what the plugin can do; none of them is a guarantee on its own. An administrator can still accept a more powerful login on purpose (audited and shown in status), root or Administrator on the host can replace the agent, and the plugin can read whatever its login can see.